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A decade has elapsed since the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created a govern-
mental framework for dealing with the revolutionary implications of atomic
energy. Generally accepted in the great congressional debates of 1945 and 1946
was the belief that the atom's revolutionary force required a revolutionary ap-
proach to atomic control. There emerged a structure for governmental control
unique not only in the mechanics of control but also in the relationship between
the executive and legislative branches.
This structure was founded upon an unprecedentedly broad grant of authori-
ty to an executive agency"-the Atomic Energy Commission-to build a vast
industrial enterprise (operating initially as a governmental monopoly) and to
regulate private activity in the atomic energy field. The broad authority vested
in the AEC for exercise in a field which most laymen apathetically assumed was
mysterious beyond their comprehension,' as well as super-secret, created a vacu-
um which was filled by creation of the uniquely powerful Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, created to oversee AEC activities. To a large extent this
Committee largely became in effect the Congress, where atomic energy matters
were concerned. The authority of the Committee, always exercised vigorously
and expansively, has tended to blur the established lines of demarcation
between executive and legislative responsibility, authority and function.
Consequently, atomic energy policy and administration have remained almost
exclusively within the orbit of the Commission and the Committee, for the
most part beyond the pale of public discussion and the normal checks and
balances of our government.
Surprisingly, this novel experiment in democratic government has escaped
the attention of scholars for almost a decade. Surprising also is the fact that
when a political scientist, Morgan Thomas, finally has undertaken such a schol-
arly study, his book, Atomic Energy and Congress, concentrates attention upon
the efficacy of this novel executive-legislative relationship in achieving sound
operational results and treats only lightly the implications of this relationship
to sound, democratic government.
In considering Atomic Energy and Congress, one must stress this necessary
caveat: The real story of atomic energy and the Congress, particularly AEC-
Joint Committee relationships, is largely obscured by the omnipresent curtain
of security. Mr. Thomas observes in the preface that available documentary
I This attitude persists even today. In the recent House debate on H.R. 12,061, 84th Cong.
2d Sess. (1956), a bill directing the AEC to embark upon a large-scale program for development
and construction of power reactors, Rep. Howard Smith of Virginia stated, "I have been un-
able to learn the merits of it [the bill], and I think you will be unable to learn the merits, be-
cause none of us are scientists." 102 Cong. Rec. 12,996 (July 24, 1956). In the same vein, Rep.
Thomson of Wyoming stated, "Congress has no business legislating in this field because it lacks




material leaves much unsaid and that most of the important decisions have been
made behind "dosed doors." Although Mr. Thomas undoubtedly has done a
thorough, competent job of analysis through study of available documents and
interviews with knowledgeable individuals, it is doubtful that the real story can
be told without access to the substantial body of information locked behind the
sdcurity curtain. Many events of critical importance are regarded as so highly
secret that published materials bear no hints, and it is unlikely Mr. Thomas'
interviewees would discuss them. The result is, of course, that the documenta-
tion available to Mr. Thomas on some important issues represents only a
small fraction of the real story, and his treatment of these issues can be no
more than an educated, but sometimes erroneous or incomplete, inference. His
effort to bridge the gap through interviews with experienced officials, though
the best technique available, results in acceptance of some erroneous or mis-
leading conclusions of fact.2
Mr. Thomas' book is concerned largely with the evolving relations between
the AEC and the Joint Committee. His central thesis is that Congress sought
to compensate for the extraordinary powers granted the AEC, and especially
for the necessary secrecy cloaking the AEC's activities, by creation of an
unusually powerful committee to conduct continuing surveillance of the Com-
mission. He describes the growth of the Committee from its initial gropings and
reluctance to assume responsibility to its more recent assumption of responsi-
bility for the atomic energy program and identification with the AEC. He
obviously is impressed with the competence and "solid record of achievement
and sound judgment" of the Committee. His ultimate conclusion is that the
AEC-Committee relationship constitutes an admirable, effective technique for
adapting the democratic system to the problems of secrecy, which otherwise
would prohibit operation of the checks inherent in the principle of separation
of powers.
The secrecy concept is central to Mr. Thomas' analysis. Unfortunately, he
accepts uncritically the hypothesis that problems of secrecy and security neces-
sitated a special governmental technique in order to preserve democratic
processes. Even assuming that the AEC's secrecy standards have been war-
ranted and proper, the area of AEC activities permeated with security consider-
ations, and thereby legitimately removed from public scrutiny, is much smaller
than is generally believed. Unfortunately, too many responsible people, includ-
ing those in high positions, have thrown up their hands in despair because of
their preconception that secrecy factors and complexities of abstract science pre-
cldude comprehension of the atomic energy program. Moreover, the Atomic
Energy Commission is not the only, or first, executive agency to operate largely
2 An example is .Ar. Thomas' conclusion that the AEC has been willing to permit the Joint
Committee staff access to AEC files. The fact is that, although the AEC has usually been
willing to give the Committee any information it requests, it has never been willing to permit
the Committee access to its files or to any "internal documents."
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behind a security curtain, and Congress apparently has been able to handle
satisfactorily other such agencies without creating special committees such as
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
It is clear that neither the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 nor the Act of' 1954 in
any way precludes members or committees of Congress from delving into secret
areas of the atomic energy program to the extent they deem necessary. The
AEC is quite willing to honor requests for Restricted Data3 needed in perform -
ance of legislative functions . 4 No security investigation or clearance is required
for members of Congress, although congressional staff personnel must have
appropriate AEC clearance.5 The only other requirement is that any Restricted
Data communicated be handled in accordance with AEC security standards.
Thus, notwithstanding the secrecy surrounding the AEC program, all members
of Congress and all congressional committees may have access to all information
necessary for adequate performance of their legislative function. It seems,
therefore, that the existence of the Committee cannot be justified on grounds
of secrecy alone.
Without question, the Committee has been effective in the sense that it has
had a major impact upon the atomic energy program. Also, the Committee has
assisted immeasurably in defending the AEC's interests before the Congress
and the public. And, as Mr. Thomas points out, on many occasions the Com-
mittee actually has taken the lead in forcing the AEC to proceed more boldly
and imaginatively than it had contemplated. These factors have contributed
greatly to such superior position as the United States now maintains in the
atomic energy field. But the major difficulty, and with this Mr. Thomas does not
deal, is that the public is unable to measure and evaluate with objectivity our
progress in atomic energy. If the AEC and the Committee have been wise and
able in their leadership, the results probably have been sound. If they have not
been wise and have made serious mistakes, we will know of the failures only in
the dim light of history. In entrusting our atomic energy program to the groups
within this small, closed circle, we have lost the benefits of exposure and cor-
rection inherent in democratic processes.
The impact of the AEC-Committee relationship upon government processes
is somewhat easier to analyze because there we have traditional standards by
3 "Restricted Data" is a statutory term designating all classified atomic energy data sub-
ject to the information-control provisions of the Atomic Energy Act.
4 Replies From Federal Agencies to Questionnaire Submitted by The Special Subcommittee
on Government Operations, a committee print of the House Committee on Government
Operations, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. 29 (1955).
' Hearings before a Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Operations on S. J. Res. 21, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. 247 (1955). If, however, derogatory in-
formation concerning a member of Congress is brought to AEC' attention it will be consid-
ered. Replies From Federal Agencies, op. cit. supra note 4, at 43. Mr. Thomas' book makes no
mention of the significant case of Rep. Robert L. Condon of California, who was denied access
to an AEC weapons test in 1953 on security grounds.
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which to judge. In this area, largely ignored by Mr. Thomas, the AEC-Com-
mittee relationship has produced some highly interesting and perhaps ques-
tionable results.
Mr. Thomas discusses with great cogency the natural development of a
sort of "personality" by executive agencies and their inevitable tendency to
participate in political struggle for attainment of agency objectives. This he
regards as the explanation of the AEC's attachment to the Committee as a
source of external support. He does not, however, discuss the opposite side of
the coin-the fact that congressional committees also develop a "personality"
and participate in political struggle for maintenance and expansion of power
and influence. Particularly is this true in the case of a powerfully constituted
committee, such as the joint Committee, which is able to exercise a virtual
monopoly over legislative activities in one of the most important and exciting
areas of government activity. The eighteen members of the Committee, with
their unique specialization in a security-hedged field of paramount public
interest, stand in an unmatched position from which to project themselves into
the foreground of national politics. Similarly, the Committee's staff, operating
under the Committee's broad statutory authority, have considerable opportunity
and incentive to direct the Committee's activities in an aggressive manner
which will enhance their own influence and prestige.
The Committee always has been conscious and jealous of its authority and
has sought from time to time to expand the area of its influence to, and perhaps
beyond, the periphery of atomic energy. Through its full control over the AEC
and its jurisdiction over the broadening area in which the atom is involved, it
has been able to exercise authority and responsibility in the areas within the
purview of the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Civil Defense Ad-
ministration.
The AEC-Committee relationship is really symbiotic in nature. The AEC
is tied to the Committee by its statutory duty to keep the Committee "fully
and currently informed" and by its recognition that it must have the Com-
mittee's support, while the Committee's authority and prestige rest in turn
upon public confidence in the atomic energy program and upon the AEC's
cooperation in maintaining the Committee's legislative monopoly.6 Both groups
recognize their mutual dependence for accomplishment of their political ob-
jectives and consider the national atomic energy program as their joint venture.
The nature of this interdependence furnishes an added insight into the prob-
lem of secrecy. The Committee's position has been strengthened greatly by the
6 In a revealing statement, AEC Chairman Strauss recently reminded the Joint Committee
that he had on many occasions "expressed concern to you about the fact that other committees
in the Congress have called upon us repeatedly for testimony on various parts of our program,
that originally, and in former days was concentrated here, but there is nothing that we can
do about it." Hearing Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on a Bill Providing for
a Civilian Atomic Power Acceleration Program, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. 36 (1956).
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exclusion of much important atomic energy information from public scrutiny
and the concomitant inaccessibility of such information for other members and
committees of Congress. Furthermore, when information falls within the defini-
tion of "Restricted Data," the Committee acquires a measure of jurisdiction,
even though the activities involved functionally may fall primarily within the
jurisdiction of other committees. Significantly, when the Committee, at the
urgent request of the Department of Defense, approved a provision in the 1954
Act for removal of information relating primarily to weapons utilization from
the Restricted Data category, it simultaneously incorporated in the Act a
provision requiring Defense to keep the Committee fully and currently in-
formed on its atomic energy interests and activities.
This symbiosis between the AEC and the Committee has, as might be ex-
pected, thrived under conditions of security-imposed secrecy. But, as if security
restrictions were not sufficient, the Committee has found it convenient to hold
closed-door hearings on many occasions when not warranted by security factors.
During 1956 the Committee or its subcommittees met in executive, rather than
public, session to hear testimony by Army representatives on radiation steriliza-
tion of food, by Bureau of the Budget representatives on disposal of AEC com-
munities, by a representative of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on industry
activities in atomic energy development and by the McKinney Panel7 staff on
the Panel's report and recommendations. The Committee also held a two-day
executive-session "seminar" in which representatives of the legal profession and
the insurance and nuclear industries discussed problems of providing insurance
for losses from civilian reactor accidents.
The tendency of the Committee to act in executive session has been marked
even in consideration of legislation; it is in this area that the dangers to demo-
cratic processes are most pronounced. The implication of this tendency, which
certainly would appear to warrant close scrutiny and analysis by political
scientists, appears unfortunately to have escaped Mr. Thomas' attention.
Atomic Energy and Congress also treats lightly the enormous authority vested
in the Committee and its impact on the traditional doctrine of separation of
powers. The book does deal with the inescapable fact that the Committee is
vested by statute with unusually great authority, but it makes no reference to
the Committee's own expansive interpretation of its authority, responsibility
and role.
Three specific grants of authority to the Joint Committee impinge upon the
doctrine of separation of powers. First, the statute expressly requires the AEC
to keep the Committee "fully and currently informed" on all AEC activities
and similarly requires the Department of Defense to report on all activities
relating to the development, utilization or application of atomic energy.8 Sec-
7 The Panel on the Impact of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was formed by the joint
Committee in 1955 with Mr. Robert McKinney as Chairman.
8 68 Stat. 956 (1954), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (Supp., 1955).
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ond, it authorizes the Committee "to utilize the services, information, facilities,
and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government." 9
The third power of the Committee, review of investigative reports and security
files, is not founded upon any express statutory provision, but rests upon the
other two authorities.
Regardless of differences of opinion members of the Committee may have
among themselves, they have been monolithic in their insistence on the broadest
conceivable interpretation of the requirement that the Committee be kept
"fully and currently informed." When in the course of the Committee's hearings
on the 1954 legislation, Chairman Cole characterized the AEC's responsibility
in this respect as "all-inclusive" subject to the possible exception of activities
relating to the nation's "war plans," a former Committee chairman, Senator
Hickenlooper, immediately took issue with the exception and Chairman Cole
quickly withdrew it.1O Similarly, Senator Hickenlooper has contended that the
AEC must submit for the Committee's scrutiny all proposed contracts prior to
execution," and the present Committee chairman has strongly asserted that
even "internal working papers" of the AEC must be furnished. 2 The extent of
the Committee's inroads on AEC privacy is reflected further in some Committee
members' complaint that the chairman of AEC failed to meet his responsibilities
by neglecting to notify the Committee of the general manager's intention to
resign, even though he had received privately, as a matter of personal confi-
dence, 13 notice of such intention. In short, the Committee believes that it is en-
tiled to any information, of whatever nature, in the AEC's possession. This view
is founded upon the interesting legal theory that the AEC and the Department
of Defense waived whatever privilege they may have enjoyed under the doc-
trine of separation of powers by presidential approval of the 1954 Act with its
"fully and currently informed" provisions. 14
Although the Committee's statutory authority to "utilize the services, infor-
mation, facilities, and personnel" of the Executive Branch has been cited by
the Committee in support of its power to obtain data from the AEC and the
Department of Defense, there is no available evidence of other exercise of the
authority. However, Senator Hickenlooper, in some enlightening floor remarks
during debate on the 1954 legislation, contended that under this authority the
Committee could direct the Attorney General to "[d]etail X number of people
9 68 Stat. 957 (1954), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (Supp., 1955).
10 Hearing Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on S. 3323 and H.R. 8862, 83d
Cong. 2d Sess. 672-73 (1954).
11 100 Cong. Rec. 10,179-80 (July 16, 1954).
12101 Cong. Rec. 9,575-83 (July 21, 1955).
13 Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth and
State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. 38-41 (1955).
14 A legal opinion to this effect by the Committee's counsel was inserted in the Congres-
sional Record. 101 Cong. Rec. 9,581-82 (July 21, 1955).
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on the staff of the FBI and have this matter investigated" or could direct the
Department of Defense to "perform certain acts in the interest of the further-
ance of the atomic energy program... provided it went to the development
of the atomic energy program.' 15
Congressional access to security files and investigative reports long has been
a matter of heated dispute among members of Congress and successive Presi-
dents, with the Executive consistently maintaining that congressional access to
these materials would prejudice seriously the usefulness of the investigative
agencies and therefore not be in the public interest. Nevertheless, the Executive
has acceded, since the earliest days of the Committee, to the latter's contention
that it is entitled to access to investigative reports and security files on partici-
pants in the atomic energy program. The Committee and its staff have, as a
matter of course, inspected these documents throughout the years, not on the
basis of any express statutory authority, but only upon its general authority to
be kept "fully and currently informed" and "to utilize the services, information,
facilities, and personnel" of the Executive Branch.
No discussion of the role of the Committee would be complete without con-
sideration of the Committee's own conception of its role. Fortunately, there is
available a 1956 Committee report 6 which provides this information in succinct
form. In this report, the Committee characterizes itself as a "watchdog" re-
placing "the public scrutiny which ordinarily follows normal government opera-
tions," and observes that its findings "have had to be accepted by the rest of the
Congress and by the public because the Commission has of necessity had to
operate behind very strict security regulations." The Committee contends also
that, in its endeavor to bring a "measure of perspective" to the atomic energy
program, it has taken the lead in hydrogen bomb development, in opening the
atomic energy industry to. private enterprise and in sponsoring "an effective
missiles program" assuring deliverability of atomic weapons. And, most remark-
able of all, the Committee maintains that it has "had to examine the operations
of the Commission to see whether or not such operations came within the law
since there is no way that the Commission's operations can be reviewed by a
court.'
17
There can be no questioning of the tremendous-indeed, almost unlimited-
power of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The ever widening impact of
atomic energy has made the Committee an important factor in military policy,
foreign relations, civil defense, maritime affairs and power policy. Its asserted,
and not often contested, power to delve into every detail of AEC activities,
I100 Cong. Rec. 10,180 (July 16, 1954).
16 H.R. Rep. No. 1,746, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. (1956). This report was issued in approval of
a resolution to increase the compensation of the executive director of the Committee's staff.
1"The 1954 Act expressly provides for judicial review of AEC's licensing and regulatory
actions. AEC's operations in other areas are subject to review by the General Accounting
Office to assure that funds are expended only as authorized by law, and it is not at all uncom-
mon for affected parties to seek judicial review of GAO determinations.
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enables it to engage in the formation and implementation of all policy decisions
in atomic energy and related areas. By skillfully nurturing the myth of super-
secrecy in atomic energy, 8 it has succeeded to a great extent in preserving, with-
out significant interference by other committees and by other members of Con-
gress, its position as the sole determinant of legislative policy in atomic energy.
On many occasions it has formulated basic policy decisions which a reluctant
AEC ultimately accepted, and has caused the AEC to modify or adjust its de-
cisions to conform with the Committee's point of view, and apparently has had
a voice in the AEC's assignment to key positions of its own personnel. 9 The
Committee's self-restraint, undoubtedly a product in large part of differences
of opinion among Committee members, has been the only check restraining
encroachment on Executive prerogatives. The Committee's ability to assume
this dominating role rests fundamentally upon its ability to secure passage of
legislation compelling AEC compliance, but the Committee has found such
action unnecessary. Actually, the Committee's acknowledged role as the con-
gressional arbiter and interpreter of atomic energy policy, coupled with the
AEC's isolation from other segments of the Congress and its dependence upon
Committee support, assure that the AEC will generally be responsive to the
Committee's "moral suasion." For such "moral suasion" to exist, there must,
of course, be unanimity or near-unanimity among the Committee members.2"
Such unanimity has prevailed in fact during most of the Committee's history
until recently, especially with respect to fundamental policies.
The net result has been that there remains a meaningful separation of
powers between the Executive and Congress only in the area in which the
Committee "watchdogs" the AEC's administration, though even here the
AEC has far less privacy and independence than other agencies. In the area of
policy formulation the Committee's encroachments upon Executive preroga-
tives and the interplay of AEC-Committee influences has led to such a break-
down of separation of powers that the policy leadership of a responsible, special-
ized agency has been diluted by the influence of a less specialized, politically-
constituted legislative body. As a corollary, the nation is deprived of democratic
18 Only in recent years has the Committee taken a vigorous position favoring declassifica-
tion of atomic energy data. Previously, the Committee was inclined to favor vigorous secrecy
standards.
19 The present Committee chairman, Senator Anderson, told the Senate that his "violent
objection and exception" to appointment of an AEC official as AEC general manager resulted
in the passing by of this official when a new general manager was appointed in 1955. 101 Cong.
Rec. 9,583 (July 21, 1955).
20 As Senator Hickenlooper has put it: "[O]n a few occasions the joint committee has been
quite unanimous in its opinion, which was not controlling over the Commission, but it had
moral suasion over the Commission. On 2 or 3 occasions the joint committee has been quite
close to unanimity or has been unanimous in believing that the Commission should not do a
certain thing or should do a certain thing. The Commission has agreed with us in the end.
The moral suasion of our committee over the actions of an administrative agency is great."
100 Cong. Rec. 10,181 (July 16, 1954).
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influences upon policy formulation inherent in normal arms-length relations
between the Executive Branch and Congress.
Difficult to accept without question is Mr. Thomas' conclusion that the Joint
Committee device provides an effective means for preserving democratic control
over the-atomic energy program. In a sense the five-man Commission operating
on a majority rule basis provides some measure of democratic control of policy
development, but even assuming that the AEC and the Committee dealt at
arms length, it would mean at best that the closed-door decisions of a five-man
Commission would be subject to legislative review only by, in effect, an
eighteen-man closed-door Congress. However, considering the Committee's fre-
quent self-identification with AEC policy objectives and its active initiation
and sponsorship of AEC policies, what means are available for preserving
democratic control over the AEC-Committee joint venture? Quite possibly the
existence of the Committee makes possible more democratic control than
would exist in its absence, but it is clear that the Joint Committee device pro-
vides somewhat less than adequate democratic control.
Atomic Energy and Congress is a valuable contribution to the unfortunately
small body of literature relating to the politics of atomic energy in the United
States. Mr. Thomas undoubtedly is correct in his conclusion that the nation
has benefited substantially, from the standpoint of its national resources and
strength, from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. It is much more likely,
however, that history will attribute these benefits to the responsibility, integrity,
devotion and ability of the members and staff of the Committee, rather than
to the Committee as a unique governmental institution. In any event, it is un-
fortunate that Mr. Thomas has concentrated his efforts on an historical sum-
mary of events, based largely upon personalities, rather than probing more
deeply the significance to our traditional democratic political institutions of
existing legislative control of atomic energy.
HAROLD P. GREEN*
* Member of the Illinois and Washington, D.C. Bars.
Corporation Giving in a Free Society. By Richard Eells. New York: Harper &
Bros., 1956. Pp. 203. $3.50.
Our non-profit institutions and foundations, one of whose principal sources
of income is the return from their own capital endowment, have been particu-
larly hard hit by inflation. Consequently a search for new benefactors began
some time ago. It was apparent that the vast number of relatively small indi-
vidual contributions would continue to be the main support, although an in-
adequate one. Large additions on a grand scale were required to meet the ever
increasing needs, but the Rockefellers, Carnegies, Vanderbilts, and Dukes of a
past era were no longer available.
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